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THE TEN MYTHS OF PRODUCT LIABILITY
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I. INTRODUCTION
Product liability is one of the most widely misunderstood and
complicated areas of the law. With the emergence of strict liability
claims and their subsequent national acceptance, many believe that
product manufacturers are responsible, similar to insurers, for any
and all injuries resulting from product-related accidents. While a
product manufacturer's responsibility is heightened and the rea-
sonableness of its conduct is closely examined whenever a serious
injury has occurred, liability is not strict in the absolute sense of the
word. Armed with a proper understanding of substantive product
liability law, the idiosyncrasies of the law in a particular jurisdiction
and the intricacies of individual types of claims, which encompass
strict liability, negligence and warranty, a product seller has nu-
merous defenses in its arsenal. The purpose of this article is to
identify the primary myths surrounding product liability law and
enable counsel to spot issues that are crucial in the proper han-
dling of a product liability case.
[Vol. 27:1
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II. MYTH No. 1: YOU CAN RECOVER BASED ON STRICT LIABILITY IN
TORT AND IMPLIED WARRANTY FOR THE SAME DEFECT
Strict liability was a theory of recovery initially developed, at
least in part, to permit injured users or consumers to avoid the rig-
ors of the privity requirement attendant to warranty claims.' Prior
to the recognition of strict liability in tort, a party who was injured
by a product could be denied recovery if he or she was not in priv-
ity with the product seller or manufacturer.! The subsequent ad-
vent of comparative fault in a majority ofjurisdictions has, however,
blurred any meaningful distinctions between negligence, strict li-
ability and warranty law. In many jurisdictions all theories of liabil-
ity, regardless of their formal label, are considered fault4 The new
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability also recognizes that
there is little, if any, distinction between the three product liability
theories.5 Although warranty theories may be provide a basis for
imposing liability in a product liability case, warranty claims are
typically redundant of other available and existing claims. As a re-
sult of this overlap, three potential misconceptions should be care-
fully examined.
A. Implied Warranty, Strict Liability And Negligence Claims Are
Governed By The Same Statute Of Limitations
Implied warranty claims can be subject to special statutes of
limitation based on the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter
"UCC"), for example, a four-year limitations period.6 Most impor-
2. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 899-901 (Cal. 1962);
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 438-40 (Cal 1944). See generally
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (NJ. 1960); MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
3. See generally Greenman, 377 P.2d 897; Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 80-84, 99-101
(discussing the early common law concepts of privity and then holding that in cer-
tain cases the privity requirement is not applicable).
4. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 668.1 (1) (1999); Uniform Comparative Fault Act,
§1(b) (1977).
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. n (1998).
6. U.C.C., § 2-725; Fell v. Kewanee Farm Equip. Co., 457 N.W.2d 911, 919
(Iowa 1990) (applying five-year statute of limitations to implied warranty actions in
Iowa); Carlisle v. Fetzer, 381 N.W.2d 627, 628-29 (Iowa 1986) (applying five-year
statute of limitations to implied warranty actions in Iowa). Most jurisdictions rec-
ognize two theories of implied warranty liability: 1) implied warranty of merchant-
ability; and 2) implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. U.C.C. §§ 2-
314 & 2-315; IOWA CODE at §§ 554.2314 (1999) (defining implied warranty of mer-
chantability) & 554.2315 (defining implied warranty of fitness for a particular
2000]
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tantly, the limitations period commences at the time tender of deliv-
ery is made, i.e., at time of initial retail sale of the product. "A cause
of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the ag-
grieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty
occurs when tender of delivery is made."7 These statutory provisions may
govern product liability claims for personal injuries which are
8
premised upon an alleged breach of warranty. Similar in opera-
tion and effect to a statute of repose, these statutes strictly circum-
scribe warranty liability on older products.
It is a common mistake to assume that the general statute of
limitations for personal injury claims (for example, two or three
years from the date of the accident) applies to a products case
grounded on breach of warranty. In many jurisdictions, warranty
claims are governed by a distinct limitations period. 9 The UCC
statute of limitations for implied warranty claims operates like a
statute of repose: a claim must be commenced within a certain time
period after the initial product sale, and if not, it is barred.'0 Nev-
ertheless, if the limitations defense is not raised it may be consid-
ered waived."
In many cases, the UCC limitations period will eliminate an
implied warranty claim. For example, in Fell, the product at issue, a
purpose). The implied warranty of merchantability alleges that the goods were not
generally fit for ordinary purposes. Logan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 219 S.E.2d
685, 687 (Va. 1975); see also U.C.C. § 2-314(2). A claim based on implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose is based on particular communications between
the buyer and seller. Specifically, breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose requires proof of the following elements: 1) the buyer had a
particular purpose, distinct from the ordinary purpose for which the goods are
typically used; 2) the manufacturer had knowledge of or reason to know of that
particular purpose; 3) the manufacturer knew or had reason to know that the
buyer was relying on the manufacturer's expertise to furnish a product that was
suitable for the particular purpose; and 4) the buyer specifically relied on the
manufacturer's expertise to furnish an appropriate product. See, e.g., Renze Hy-
brids, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 418 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Iowa 1988); Van Wyk v. Norden
Lab., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 81, 84 (Iowa 1984); Bergquist v. Mackay Engines, Inc., 538
N.W.2d 655, 658 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). As will be discussed in section I(b), war-
ranty claims may also be subject to disclaimer and limitation defenses.
7. U.C.C. § 2-725 (emphasis added); IOWA CODE § 554.2725 (emphasis
added).
8. Fell, 457 N.W.2d at 918-19.
9. See, e.g., Hoffman v. A.B. Chance Co., 339 F. Supp. 1385 (M.D. Pa. 1972);
O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 335 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Fell, 457 N.W.2d at 918-
19.
10. See, e.g., Lowe v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 879 F. Supp. 28, 30 (E.D. Pa.
1995); Kern v. Frye Copysystems, Inc., 878 F. Supp. 660, 664-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
11. Ruddock v. First Nat'l Bank, 559 N.E.2d 483, 483 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
[Vol. 27:1
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portable farm elevator, was built and sold in 1966. Plaintiff was not
injured until 1986, twenty years later. Though the lawsuit was filed
within two years of the accident (the statute of limitations applica-
ble to personal injury actions), the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court's dismissal of the warranty claim. It found that the
warranty action had expired in 1971, five years after the auger was
first sold and fifteen years prior to the plaintiffs injury.1 2 Otherju-
risdictions have reached similar results. 13  Consequently, counsel
must closely examine the applicable law, in conjunction with the
age of the product, to determine if a commercial code statute of
limitations completely bars the warranty claim in a products case.
B. Warranty Disclaimers Are Ineffective Or Void In Personal Injury Cases
Many products are sold with express language which disclaims
or limits liability for warranty claims and other matters, such as li-
ability for incidental and consequential damages.14 These terms
may be found in operator's manuals, sales agreements, pre-printed
invoices, package inserts, or printed on the product itself or its con-
tainer. The express terms of most manufacturer's written warran-
ties exclude liability for breach of the implied warranties of mer-
chantability or fitness for a particular purpose. Warranty
disclaimers can be effective even for personal injury, product liabil-
ity claims. They are commonly governed by the UCC because, in
most instances, the product at issue will satisfy the rather broad
definition of a good under the UCC.
5
To effectively disclaim liability for a defective product based on
breach of implied warranty, the disclaimer must satisfy the follow-
ing standard:
12. Fell v. Kewanee Farm Equip. Co., 457 N.W.2d 911,919 (Iowa 1990).
13. See, e.g., Shaw v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 973 F. Supp. 539 (D.
Md. 1997); Sille v. McCann Constr. Specialties Co., 638 N.E.2d 676 (Il. App. Ct.
1994); Spieker v. Westgo, Inc., 479 N.W.2d 837 (N.D. 1992).
14. Although not explored in this article, assuming the disclaimer is not con-
trary to representations made to the purchaser, express warranties are also subject
to disclaimer and limitation of remedies. U.C.C. § 2-316; see also, e.g., L.S. Heath &
Son, Inc. v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 561, 563 (7th Cir. 1993); Stauffer Chem.
Co. v. Curry, 778 P.2d 1083, 1087 (Wyo. 1989).
15. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-102 (indicating that U.C.C. "applies to transactions in
goods") & 2-105 (defining goods as things "which are movable at the time of'
sale); IOWA CODE §§ 554.2102 (indicating that U.C.C. "applies to transactions in
goods") & 554.2105 (defining goods as things "which are movable at the time of'
sale); Fell, 457 N.W.2d at 918 (applying U.C.C. warranty provisions to claim for per-
sonal injuries which allegedly resulted during use of grain elevator).
2000]
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[T] o exclude or modify the implied warranty of mer-
chantability or any part of it the language must mention
merchantability and in case of a writing must be con-
spicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty
of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and con-
spicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of
fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "[t]here
are no warranties which extend beyond the description on
the face hereof. 6
Consequently, any terms attempting to disclaim an implied
warranty must be conspicuous. The UCC specifically defines the
requirement that the warranty be conspicuous.
A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a
reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to
have noticed it. A printed heading in capitals... is con-
spicuous. Language in the body of a form is conspicuous
if it is in larger or other contrasting type or
color .... Whether a term or clause is conspicuous or not is
for decision by the court."
To disclaim liability for merchantability, the language must
specifically use the term-of-art "merchantability." To exclude im-
plied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose, the disclaimer
must be in writing. Whether a specific warranty disclaimer satisfies
these requirements is a question of law for the court."
Most product manufacturer's warranty disclaimers satisfy the
conspicuous requirement established by the UCC. For example,
many manufacturers set forth the terms of the warranty in the op-
erator's manual for the product. The use of bold type, capital let-
ters or contrasting print or type is common. Courts have consis-
tently held that this mode of presentation is conspicuous. 19 These
16. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (emphasis added); IOwA CODE at § 554.2316(2) (em-
phasis added).
17. U.C.C. at § 1-201; IOWA CODE at § 554.1201(10).
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Transp. Corp. of Am. v. IBM, 30 F.3d 953, 959 (8th Cir. 1994)
(ruling that disclaimer which utilized capital letters was conspicuous); H.B. Fuller
Co. v. Kinetic Sys., Inc., 932 F.2d 681, 689 (7th Cir. 1991) (determining that dis-
claimer, which contained the only text in capital letters on a page titled "WAR-
RANTY," satisfied the conspicuous requirement and citing additional authority for
its conclusion that using capital letters rendered disclaimer conspicuous); Boston
Helicopter Charter v. Agusta Aviation Corp., 767 F. Supp. 363, 376 (D. Mass. 1991)
(using capital letters for disclaimer was conspicuous); Sealy v. Ford Motor Co., 499
F. Supp. 475, 477 (E.D.N.C. 1980) (using capital letters for disclaimer was con-
spicuous); Dana Commercial Credit Corp. v. Hanscom's Truck Stop, Inc., 679 A.2d
[Vol. 27:1
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decisions, interpreting similar or identical UCC provisions from
various jurisdictions are entitled to deference in jurisdictions which
20
have adopted the UCC or a comparable variation. Consequently,
the trial court may find, as a matter of law, that a manufacturer's
written disclaimer completely precludes any recovery based on
breach of implied warranty.
In many cases, a claimant will argue that he or she did not read
or have actual notice of the disclaimer, and for this reason, it is in-
operative. Some courts have found, however, that it is not neces-
sary that a product purchaser or user have actual knowledge of a war-
ranty disclaimer in order for the disclaimer to be fully effective."
In Childers, the court flatly rejected the contention that a warranty
disclaimer was ineffective because the provision was not specifically
22brought to the buyer's attention.
Consequently, when considering a product liability claim
based on breach of warranty, it is important that counsel thor-
oughly review any warranty materials provided by the manufacturer
to determine if a warranty theory is subject to summary disposition.
C. An Implied Warranty Theory Can Be Pursued With Strict Liability Or
Negligence Claims As An Alternative Ground Of Liability
Many courts have held that, absent exceptional circumstances,
implied warranty theories of recovery should not be submitted to a
jury with a claim based on strict liability in tort.2' This is consistent
with the new Restatement.
Regardless of the doctrinal label attached to a particular
570, 571 (N.H. 1996) (incorporating capital letters in bold type face into section
heading and disclaimer language was conspicuous, despite relative size).
20. Union Carbide Corp. v. Consumers Power Co., 636 F. Supp. 1498, 1501
(E.D. Mich. 1986); see also Quaker Oats Co. v. Cedar Rapids Human Rights
Comm., 268 N.W.2d 862, 866 (Iowa 1978) (stating that courts should give defer-
ence to decisions from other jurisdictions when interpreting a statute containing
similar or identical language).
21. See, e.g., Childers & Venters, Inc. v. Sowards, 460 S.W.2d 343 (Ky. 1970);
Architectural Aluminum Corp. v. Macarr, Inc., 333 N.Y.S.2d 818 (N.Y. App. Div.
1972).
22. Childers, 460 S.W.2d at 344-45.
23. See, e.g., Brewster v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1377, 1390 (S.D. Iowa
1994); Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672, 684-85 (Iowa
1970), appeal after remand, 199 N.W.2d 373, 381-82 (Iowa 1972) (noting that, in
product liability suits for personal injuries, "[O] rdinarily, strict liability in tort is in
lieu of one or more of implied warranty theories and both theories should be
submitted only in exceptional situations").
2000]
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claim, design and warning claims rest on a risk-utility as-
sessment. To allow two or more factually identical... claims
to go to a jury under different labels, whether strict liabil-
ity, negligence, or implied warranty of merchantability,
would generate confusion and may well result in inconsis-
tent verdicts.24
Plaintiffs counsel obviously desires to submit multiple theories
in an attempt to obtain two bites at same the apple, much like de-
fense counsel will try to defend the matter using alternative and
multiple defenses. However, instructing the jury with multiple
claims which are practically indistinguishable is not legally proper,
confuses the court and jury, and unduly emphasizes the plaintiffs
theories of recovery. Accordingly, either implied warranty or strict
liability should be submitted, but not both.25 If a plaintiff elects to
proceed on a theory of strict liability, the implied warranty theory
should be dismissed, and vice-versa. This result makes sense be-
cause the origins of strict liability were, to a large extent, premised
upon avoiding the strictures of contractual privity applicable to
warranty claims. Since strict liability was intended to supplant war-
ranty in such cases, there is no proper justification to submit both
claims in the same case for the same claim of defect.
III. MYrH No. 2: DESIGN DEFECT CAN BE BASED ON STRICT
LIABILITY IN TORT
Defective design claims are often advanced under both negli-
gence and strict liability theories, and the argument is often made
that the product manufacturer and seller is responsible for both
defective (i.e., strict liability in tort) and negligent design. This
practice, however, has the effect of improperly emphasizing plain-
tiffs theories for recovery. It can further lead to inconsistent jury
verdicts and unnecessary appeals and retrials. As a practical matter,
there is no reasoned distinction between design defect claims
26grounded on strict liability or negligence. Many courts have rec-
ognized this fact and, accordingly, will only submit a desin defect
claim to the jury under a single legal theory of recovery. We be-
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUcTS LIABILITY§ 2 cmt. n (1998).
25. Id.
26. Id. (stating that "[r]egardless of the doctrinal label attached to a particu-
lar claim, design...claims rest on a risk-utility assessment").
27. See, e.g., Hillrichs v. Avco Corp., 478 N.W.2d 70, 75-76 (Iowa 1991) (find-
ing that strict liability design defect claim depended on the same elements as neg-
[Vol. 27:1
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lieve, however, that application of the [applicable] standards to the
present fact pattern will make the strict liability claim depend on
virtually the same elements of proof as are required to establish the
negligence claim. Consequently, we hold that only the negligence
claim should be retried." The Iowa Supreme Court in Hillrichs rec-
ognized the growing acceptance of this position.
We make this determination [to remand for trial on negligent
design only, and not both strict liability and negligence] only with
respect to the present case. We note, however, a growing number of
courts and commentators have found that, in cases in which the plaintiff's
injuy is caused by an alleged defect in the design of a product, there is no
practical difference between theories of negligence and strict liability.2
9
Historically, courts relied upon the so-called "conduct-
product" distinction in an attempt to explain the difference be-
tween strict liability and negligent design theories. Recently, how-
ever, courts have recognized that the conduct-product distinction is
"illusory."'30 Such tortuous sophistry no longer justifies submitting
both strict liability and negligence theories for the same alleged de-
sign deficiency. Other courts referred to the type of knowledge
held by the seller: in strict liability, knowledge was legally inferred
or imputed to the seller, while in negligence cases, the standard
was described as "knew or in the exercise of reasonable care,
should have known.
32
Only one legal theory for design liability should be submitted
in a products case. When it is alleged that a product's design is de-
fective, only a negligence standard should apply.33 "The standard of
ligence claim); Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66, 69-70 (Ky. 1973);
Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 187 (Mich. 1984); Holm v. Sponco Mfg.
Co., 324 N.W.2d 207, 213 (Minn. 1982); Foley v. Clark Equip. Co., 523 A.2d 379,
385-92 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
28. Hillrichs, 478 N.W.2d at 75-76 (footnote omitted).
29. Id.
30. Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 1994).
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. n (1998)
(recognizing that design defect claims are governed by an identical standard,
whether premised on strict liability or negligence).
32. Olson, 522 N.W.2d at 288-89 (citing extensive legal authority). See, e.g.,
Sita v. Danek Med., Inc., 43 F. Supp 2d 245, 259 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("The manufac-
turer satisfies its duty by 'warn[ing] of all potential dangers in its prescription
drugs that it knew, or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known to
exist.").
33. See, e.g., Whitted v. Gen. Motors Corp., 58 F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir. 1995);
Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66, 69-70 (Ky. 1973); Prentis v. Yale
Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 187 (Mich. 1984); Foley v. Clark Equip. Co., 523 A.2d
2000]
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safety of goods imposed on the seller or manufacturer of a product
is essentially the same whether the theory of liability is labeled war-
ranty or negligence or strict tort liability: the product must not be
unreasonably dangerous at the time that it leaves the defendant's
" ,34
possession.
A design claim focuses on the manufacturer's care in selecting• 35
or adopting a particular design choice. Whether defect is defined
in terms of consumer expectations, risk-utility or a hybrid of the
two formulations, a negligence analysis is particularly appropriate
when a design is at issue. By way of direct analogy, in failure to
warn cases, many courts have refused to submit both strict liability
and negligence charges to the jury.16 Warnings physically affixed to
products and instructions in an operator's manual are clearly a part
of the product's intended design. Criticisms of intended warnings or
instructions are more closely akin to design defect claims, as op-
posed to manufacturing defect claims, which involve an unintended
flaw or defect.
The genesis of strict liability in tort also supports this result.
Strict liability was originally premised, at least in part, upon the ju-
dicial belief that it was inherently difficult for plaintiffs to prove
specific acts of negligence which created a manufacturing flaw that
later caused an accident." Strict liability (or so-called "liability
without fault") was adopted to allay that concern. Under strict li-
ability, if the product had a flaw, the manufacturer would be held
responsible, regardless of the care exercised when manufacturing
the product. Accordingly, strict liability in tort is appropriate in the
379, 385-92 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design
Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV.
593, 593 (1980); Michael Hoenig, Product Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is There a
Better Approach ?, 8 SW. U. L. REV. 109, 109 (1976); Keith Miller, Design Defect Litiga-
tion in Iowa: The Myths of Strict Liability, 40 DRAKE L. REv. 465, 465 (1991); William
C. Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEx. L. REv. 777, 797
(1983).
34. Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 968 (4th Cir. 1971).
35. When a jury decides that the risk of harm outweighs the utility of a par-
ticular design (that the product is not as safe as it should be) it is saying that in
choosing the particular design and cost tradeoffs, the manufacturer exposed the
consumer to greater risk of danger than he should have. Conceptually and analyti-
cally, this approach bespeaks negligence. Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d
176, 184 (Mich. 1984).
36. Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 284 (Iowa 1994).
37. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963);
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944); Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
[Vol. 27:1
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context of a manufacturing defect claim, only.38 The bedrock public
policy concerns which undergird the adoption of strict liability in
tort simply do not exist in a design defect case, which involves an
appraisal of the product seller's intended design.
The practical dangers of submitting both negligent and strict
liability design claims can easily be illustrated by the potential for
inconsistent jury verdicts. This most often occurs when the jury al-
lows a recovery based on negligence, yet refuses to find that there
was any defect in the product that was causative of the injury. The
court need only consider the possibility of an inconsistent jury ver-
dict or contradictory, irreconcilable answers to special verdict ques-
tions. These inconsistencies raise the specter of reversible error
and a new trial.39 This circumstance occurred in Tipton v. Michelin
Tire Co., and the court was unable to reconcile the two findings.
At least one court has held that in order to hold a
manufacturer liable under either strict liability or
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILIY § 2 cmt. n (1998).
The Restatement (Third) makes the following distinction for manufacturing defect
claims, the only type of claim that should be permitted under a strict liability the-
ory:
A different approach may be appropriate for claims based on manufac-
turing defects, since the rule set forth in Subsection (a) does not require
risk-utility assessment while a negligence claim does. That is, the two
types of manufacturing defect claims are based on different factual
predicates. Negligence rests on a showing of fault leading to product de-
fect. Strict liability rests merely on a showing of product defect. When a
plaintiff believes a good claim for the negligent creation of (or failure to
discover) a manufacturing defect may be established, the plaintiff may as-
sert such a claim in addition to a claim in strict liability under Subsection
(a). The plaintiff in such a case should have the opportunity to prove
fault and also to assert the right to recover based on strict liability. How-
ever, clearly it would be inconsistent for a trier of fact to find no manu-
facturing defect on a section 2(a) claim and yet return a verdict of liabil-
ity because the defendant was negligent in having poor quality control.
What must be shown under either theory is that the product in question
did, in fact, have a manufacturing defect at time of sale that contributed
to causing the plaintiffs harm. Nevertheless, it is still inappropriate to
raise or submit to the jury a warranty claim in conjunction with a manu-
facturing defect claim premised on strict liability or negligence.
Id.
In connection with manufacturing defects, a section 2(a) tort claim and
an implied warranty of merchantability claim rest on the same factual predicate-
the sale by the defendant of a product that departs from the manufacturer's speci-
fications irrespective of anyone's fault. Thus, these two claims are duplicative and
may not be pursued together in the same case.
39. Lambert v. Gen. Motors Corp., 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 657, 659-61 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998) (holding that inconsistencies in special verdict forms on strict liability and
negligent design claims required new trial). The jury may find liability based on
negligence, but not strict liability (supposedly the easier claim to establish).
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facturer liable under either strict liability or negligence, a
jury must first find that the product in question was defec-41
tive. In Sexton, the Fourth Circuit stated:
Although Kentucky also imposes the traditional duty of
care on manufacturers to make products reasonably safe,
when a product liability claim is based on a design defect,
the articulation of liability, whether based on negligent
breach of a duty of care or on strict liability, reduces to a
single question of whether the product was defective.
In other words, proof of a defective product is essential to
the products liability or negligence claim. According to
Sexton, the distinction between the two claims is of "no
practical significance. 42 We agree that the two claims in
this case depend on the existence of a defective product.
As indicated above, however, the jury found no defective
product for purposes of the strict liability claim, but did
find that the product was defective for purposes of the
negligence claim. That finding, we believe, is legally in-
consistent.
Another potential problem involves the application of Federal
Rule of Evidence 407 relating to proof of "subsequent remedial
measures." In a minority of jurisdictions, subsequent remedial
measures are admissible for a strict liability, as opposed to a negli-
gence, claim." If both claims are submitted, confusing limiting in-
structions regarding the use of this evidence must be utilized.
From the product manufacturer's point of view, it is doubtful
whether limiting instructions can actually "unring the bell" of im-
proper and prejudicial proof. 45 If only a negligence claim is sub-
40, Sexton v. Bell Helmets, 926 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 820 (1991).
41. Id. at 335 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 336 (quoting Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66, 69-70
(Ky. 1973)).
43. Tipton v. Michelin Tire Co., 101 F.3d 1145, 1150 (8th Cir. 1996).
44. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Fulkerson, 812 S.W.2d 119, 125 (Ky. 1991);
Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme Turbomeca France, 963 S.W.2d 639, 651 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1997).
45. Fish v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 779 F.2d 836, 840 (2nd Cir. 1985) (limiting
instruction did not cure error created by admitting evidence of manufacturer's
subsequent warnings); Sheehy v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 631 F.2d 649, 652 (9th Cir.
1980) (limiting instruction did not cure error created by erroneous admission of
collateral evidence that court believed would be improperly used by jury); Werner
v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981)
(noting that when evidence is admissible for a limited purpose, a party is not free
to use it for a forbidden purpose, over objection, and insulate himself from rever-
[Vol. 27:1
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 17
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss1/17
THE TEN MYTHS OF PRODUCT LIABILITY
mitted, however, subsequent remedial measures are inadmissible
under Rule 407. If only a single claim based on negligent design is
submitted to the jury, these complications are easily avoided.
IV. MYTH No. 3: FAILURE To WARN CAN BE BASED ON STRICT
LIABILITY IN TORT
Product liability claimants and their counsel often request that
the trial court submit "failure to warn" claims on both strict liability
and negligence theories for the same claim of defect. This, how-
ever, is no less duplicative than submitting both strict liability and
negligent design theories. As a result, a number of courts have
found that submitting such overlapping claims is inappropriate.
46
In Olson, the Iowa Supreme Court specifically held that "failure
to warn" claims are based solely on negligence rather than strict li-
ability. This is because manufacturers are only required to, and
feasibly only can, warn against risks or dangers that were known or
should have been known at the time of manufacture.47 This posi-
tion is consistent with the Restatement (Third).48 The new Restatement
also recognizes that a growing number of courts have refused to
submit warning and design claims under both negligence and strict
liability theories. "A fair number of courts have taken the position
that in a design or failure to warn case, it is redundant (and thus is
inappropriate) to allow the plaintiff to go to the jury on both negli-
sal by pointing to limiting instruction given at close of case); United States v. Fi-
gueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2nd Cir. 1980) (balancing required by Rule 403 would
be unnecessary if limiting instructions always insured thatjury would consider evi-
dence only for fixed purpose; thus, court must consider likelihood that jury will
not follow a limiting instruction).
46. See, e.g., McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1044 (2nd Cir. 1995)
(finding that elements of failure to warn claim are identical under negligence and
strict liability); Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284 (Iowa 1994); see also RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. n (1998) (allowing two
or more factually identical risk-utility claims to go to a jury, whether strict liability
or negligence, would generate confusion and possibly result in inconsistent ver-
dicts).
47. See, e.g., Fibreboard Corp. v. Fenton, 845 P.2d 1168, 1175 (Colo. 1993)
(finding that manufacturer cannot warn against dangers that were unknown or
unknowable under prevailing scientific and technological principles at the time of
manufacture); Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 402 N.E.2d 194, 198 (Ill. 1980) (re-
quiring that plaintiff demonstrate that manufacturer knew or should have known
of danger); Olson, 522 N.W.2d at 289 (refusing to impose a duty to warn against
unknown or unknowable dangers).
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. n (1998)
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gence and strict liability."49
In fact, Restatement reporters, Professors Henderson and Twer-
ski, have long criticized courts that apply strict liability in failure to
warn cases.50 Many courts have now adopted this theory, which is
logically consistent with the position that design claims should only
be submitted under a negligence standard. Warnings or instructions,
whether physically appended to a product or in an operator's man-
ual, are part of the intended design. Nevertheless, if not properly
objected to or contested, plaintiffs will continue to allege redun-
dant and improper warning claims and many courts will submit
such claims to the jury, all to the detriment of manufacturing de-
fendants.
At a minimum, a court trying a product liability case should not
submit to the jury warning claims under both strict liability and neg-
ligence theories. There is no practical distinction between the
theories. Submitting both theories to the jury also creates the po-
tential for an inconsistent jury verdict. Further, as noted in the
previous section, in some jurisdictions, submitting both strict liabil-
ity and negligent claims can be problematic with regard to the ad-
missibility of "subsequent remedial measures" evidence under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 407. Finally, submitting multiple claims to a
jury based on the same conduct acts improperly places undue em-
phasis on the plaintiffs liability theories and unfairly increases the
chances of a plaintiffs verdict.
V. MYrH No. 4: STRICT LIABILITY APPLIES EVEN IF THE PRODUCT
HAS BEEN ALTERED, So LONG As THE ALTERATION WAS
FORESEEABLE
Under strict liability in tort, a plaintiff must prove that the
product had not experienced a "substantial change in its condi-
51tion" subsequent to the date of sale. Strict liability does not ex-
tend to injuries which cannot be traced to the condition of the
52product as it reached the market. Product sellers are not respon-
49. Id. § 2, Reporters' Note, cmt. n.
50. Henderson & Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty
Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 271-78 (1990).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 402A (1977) (indicating that there
must not be a "substantial change in the condition" of the product); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (stating that defect must exist "at the
time of sale or distribution").
52. See, e.g., Fell v. Kewanee Farm Equip. Co., 457 N.W.2d 911, 918 (Iowa
1990) (stating that manufacturer is not responsible for subsequent "mishandling,
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sible for injuries or damages which result from a defect caused by
mishandling or subsequent alteration of a product that was safe
when it left the manufacturer's control .
In many cases a plaintiff will be unable to establish this ele-
ment of their prima facie case. In fact, plaintiffs' liability experts will
often admit that the condition of the product has been appreciably
changed subsequent to the date of manufacture. 54 After such an
admission, the court is in a position to rule, as a matter of law, that
the strict liability claim should be dismissed. Unfortunately, this re-
sult occurs in far too few cases, often because the fundamental na-
ture of this element of strict tort liability is misunderstood.
Many courts have misapplied strict liability, concluding that if
a modification is reasonably foreseeable, strict liability is still appli-
cable.55 This standard, however, confuses strict liability with negli-
gence claims, and confuses the no-substantial-change-in condition
element with the reasonably-foreseeable-use element of a 402A
strict liability case. Trial courts routinely (and incorrectly) permit
the jury to determine: 1) whether it is reasonably foreseeable the
product would be changed subsequent to sale; and 2) if it is rea-
sonably foreseeable, whether the manufacturer must guard against
that possibility; and 3) whether a substantial change in condition
has occurred. This analysis misapplies section 402A of the Re-
alteration, or other cause beyond the seller's or manufacturer's control" which
renders a product defective); Duggan v. Hallmark Pool Mfg. Co., Inc., 398 N.W.2d
175, 178 (Iowa 1986); Smith v. Air Feeds, Inc., 519 N.W.2d 827, 830 (Iowa Ct. App.
1994) (requiring in strict liability that the claimant demonstrate that product was
not substantially modified or changed after leaving manufacturer's control).
53. See, e.g., Kromer v. Beazer East, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 78, 80-81 (W.D.N.Y.
1993); Hart v. Hytrol Conveyor Co., Inc., 823 F. Supp. 87, 91-93 (N.D.N.Y. 1993);
Fell, 457 N.W.2d at 918; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. g
(stating that seller is not liable when product is delivered in a safe condition and
subsequent changes or alterations created the dangerous condition).
54. If a change in condition occurred subsequent to the accident as a result
of mishandling by the plaintiff, expert witnesses or others outside the control of
the manufacturer, the product manufacturer may have a spoliation of evidence
defense which could result in an evidentiary presumption against the claimant,
dismissal or summary judgment. E.g., Patton v. Newmar Corp., 538 N.W.2d 116,
119-120 (Minn. 1995); Hoffman v. Ford Motor Co., 587 N.W.2d 66, 68 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1998).
55. See, e.g., Woods v. Graham Eng'g. Corp., 539 N.E.2d 316, 318-19 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1984) (finding that manufacturer is not liable if injury resulted from altera-
tion of product, but stating that liability may be found if change was foreseeable);
Davis v. Berwind Corp., 640 A.2d 1289, 1296-99 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (stating that
material changes preclude liability for manufacturer, but examining whether
change could have been foreseen).
56. Davis, 640 A.2d at 1287 (recognizing that unless inferences entirely clear,
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statement (Second) of Torts as originally written and intended. Fore-
seeability has no bearing on plaintiffs' burden to prove that the
product "did not undergo a substantial change in its condition" af-
ter the time of sale. Instead, in the context of a strict liability claim,
foreseeability only relates to whether the product was being used in
a reasonably foreseeable manner. Reasonably foreseeable use is. a
separate element of strict liability and has no relationship to the
separate and distinct element that there be no substantial change
in the condition of the product. If a product was substantially
changed or modified after its sale and the change was not intended
by the manufacturer, strict liability should not apply. While a neg-
ligence claim may be appropriate, even though a modification has
occurred, a strict liability claim contravenes the text and intent of
57,the Restatement and should not be countenanced.
In addition, where the product has been modified in such a
way as to cause the injury, a causation analysis, either superseding
cause or sole proximate cause, may be employed to reduce -or
eliminate liability.58 Unfortunately, many courts will abdicate the
causation question to the jury, even in cases where product modifi-
cations clearly caused an accident which would not have otherwise
occurred.
Consequently, any substantial change or modification to a
product, subsequent to the date of sale, that is causally related to an
alleged accident should preclude the application of strict liability in
tort.
VI. MYTH NO. 5: A PRODUCT MANUFACTURER'S DUTIES ARE FIXED
AT TIME OF SALE
According to traditional notions of strict liability in tort based
on Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402A, the defect that is the
subject of the case must exist at time of sale. However, there has
foreseeability on product liability issues is ajury question).
57. William H. Hardie, Confronting Foreseeability in Products Litigation, 36(10)
FOR THE DEFENSE 4 (1994); Joseph A. Sherman & Kathryn E. Nichols, "Foreseeable
Product" Modification: A Cloak and Shield for the Defense, 30(10) FOR THE DEFENSE 18
(1988) (discussing the use and misuse of foreseeability in products cases).
58. See, e.g., Chumbley v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 521 N.W.2d 192, 194 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1993) (finding it proper to argue that an employer's fault was the sole
proximate cause of the accident even though the employer was not a party to the
case); Woods v. Graham Eng'g Corp., 539 N.E.2d 316, 318-20 (Ill. Ct. App. 1989)
(recognizing that modification of product may preclude liability for manufactur-
ing defendant because it was subsequent intervening cause of injury).
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been a recent ominous trend toward doing away with this impor-
tant element under the guise of so-called "post-sale duties." Post-
sale duties are troublesome because "hindsight is always 20-20 vi-
sion." Most twenty-year-old products cannot withstand the effect of
being compared to similar products made in 2000. The intrinsic
unfairness which results from judging a product design against sub-
sequent events and technological advances cannot be overesti-
mated. In the last ten years claims for "failure to retrofit," "failure
to recall" or breach of the "continuing duty to warn" have been
popular. Nevertheless, a clear majority of courts have clearly and
unmistakably ruled that there is no legal duty to "recall" or "retro-
fit. ,59
Notwithstanding the likely success of precluding claims based
on the failure to "recall" or "retrofit" a product, plaintiffs can argue
that a manufacturing defendant has a "post-sale" or "continuing
duty to warn," which is often undefined and virtually limitless.
The pervasive danger inherent in post-sale "duty" claims, particu-
larly the post-sale duty to warn, mandates a clear understanding of
the salient legal issues and potential defense strategies.
A. A Manufacturer Has A Legal Duty To Recall Or Retrofit A Product
Frequently, plaintiffs will advance a claim based upon or refer
to an amorphous "duty" to "recall or retrofit" the product involved
in a case. Perhaps even more insidious is the "professional witness"
expert who opines, with an air of authority, that a certain product
"should have been recalled years ago." Sometimes the "failure to
recall" argument is used in an attempt to garner a verdict of puni-
tive damages. Moreover, when a manufacturer voluntarily insti-
tutes its own recall, the rejoinder from plaintiffs is that the manu-
facturer should have acted more quickly.6' A more telling example
of the old adage, "damned if you do, damned if you don't," is diffi-
cult to find.
In a clear majority ofjurisdictions, however, courts have found
59. See, e.g., Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497, 503 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1115 (1994); Gregory v. Cincinnati, Inc., 538 N.W.2d 325, 333-34 (Mich.
1995).
60. See generally Lovick v. Wil-Rich, 588 N.W.2d 688, 695-96 (Iowa 1999) (pro-
viding factors circumscribing the scope of post-sale duty to warn).
61. See, e.g., Burke v. Deere & Co., 780 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. Iowa 1991) (find-
ing manufacturer of combine liable for failing to timely recall product), reversed, 6
F.3d 497, 508-09 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that there is no duty to recall or retrofit
a product), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1115 (1994).
2000]
17
Reynolds and Kirschman: The Ten Myths of Product Liability
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
62
that a manufacturer has no duty to retrofit or recall a product.
Section eleven of the Restatement (Third) also adopts this position,
finding that there is no independent duty to recall a product. A
manufacturer is liable for failing to recall a product only if it fails to:
1) conduct a recall that was mandated by governmental order or
legislation; or 2) act reasonably when conducting a voluntary re-
call. Accordingly, claims that the manufacturer should have "re-
called" or "retrofitted" a given product are best contested through
motions for partial summary judgment and motions in limine pre-
venting any reference to this position (by the lawyers or experts) at
trial.
In addition, if claims for post-sale failure to warn are made, the
jury must be given a limiting instruction which advises that "there is
no duty to recall or retrofit [the product] in this case." Further, it
must be explained that having the manufacturer go into the field
and physically attach new warnings is a product "retrofit," an action
that is not required by law.64 Otherwise, the jury may improperly
speculate regarding possible recall or retrofit actions during delib-
erations.
B. A Manufacturer's "Continuing Duty To Warn" Is Limited To The
Duty To Exercise Reasonable Care
A continuing duty to warn claim is troublesome because it is
premised on a negligence theory and courts typically do not in-
trude on the fault findings in negligence cases by the jury. The Re-
statement (Third), however, advocates a post-sale duty to warn only in
certain limited circumstances.
62. See, e.g., Horstmyer v. Black & Decker, Inc., 151 F.3d 765, 773 (8th Cir.
1998); Burke, 6 F.3d at 509; Habecker v. Copperloy Corp., 893 F.2d 49, 54 (3d Cir.
1990), appeal after remand, 942 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1991); Syrie v. Knoll Int'l, 748 F.2d
304, 311-12 (5th Cir. 1984); Zettle v. Handy Mfg. Co., 837 F. Supp. 222, 224 (E.D.
Mich. 1992), affd, 998 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1993); Eschenburg v. Navistar Int'l
Transp. Corp., 829 F. Supp. 210, 215 (E.D. Mich. 1993); Estate of Kimmel v. Clark
Equip. Co., 773 F. Supp. 828, 829-30 (W.D. Va. 1991); Modelski v. Navistar Int'l
Transp. Co., 707 N.E.2d 239, 247 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Gregory, 538 N.W.2d at 336-
37; Zychowski v. A.J. Marshall Co., Inc., 590 N.W.2d 301, 302 (Mich. Ct. App.
1998); Morrison v. Kubota Tractor Corp., 891 S.W.2d 422, 429-30 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994). But see Romero v. Int'l. Harvester Co., 979 F.2d 1444, 1450 (10th Cir. 1992)
(imposing post-sale duty to "remedy the defect" but no imperative duty to retrofit).
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUcTS LIABILITY § 11 (1998).
64. Tabieros v. Clark Equip. Co., 944 P.2d 1279, 1296 (Haw. 1997) (recogniz-
ing the distinction between a post-sale warning and a post-sale retrofit which in-
volves actual modifications or physical attachments to the product).
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(a) One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise dis-
tributing products is subject to liability for harm to persons or
property caused by the seller's failure to provide a warning after the
time of sale or distribution of a product when a reasonable person
in the seller's position would provide such a warning.
(b) A reasonable person in the seller's position would provide
a warning after the time of sale when:
(1) the seller knows or reasonably should know that the prod-
uct poses a substantial risk of harm to persons or property; and
(2) those to whom a warning might be provided can be identi-
fied and may reasonably be assumed to be unaware of the risk of
harm; and
(3) a warning can be effectively communicated to and acted
on by those to whom a warning might be provided; and
(4) the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify the burden
65of providing a warning.
Despite acceptance of a post-sale duty to warn theory by the Re-
statement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, this theory of recovery has
not been adopted by every jurisdiction.
66
When confronted with a post-sale warnings claim, several is-
sues should be kept in mind. First, defense strategies employed
when defending failure to warn claims are, in general, equally ap-
plicable to post-sale or continuing duty to warn claims. For exam-
ple, the absence of causation may be a compelling argument. Spe-
cifically, numerous decisions have held that a claimant has failed to
establish the necessary causal link for a failure to warn claim if: 1)
the warning would not have prevented the accident; 2) the claim-
ant was knowledgeable of the danger and would not have modified
his or her behavior; or 3) the risk was open or obvious." Second,the duty only arises when a "reasonable" seller would provide a
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODucTs LIABILITY § 10 (emphasis
added).
66. See, e.g., Lovick v. Wil-Rich, 588 N.W.2d 688, 696 (Iowa 1999) (adopting
post-sale duty to warn as a cause of action in Iowa); Modelski v. Navistar Int'l
Transp. Corp., 707 N.E.2d 239, 247 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (declining to recognize a
post-sale duty to warn); Desantis v. Frick Co., 745 A.2d 624, 631 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1999) (refusing to impose a post-sale duty to warn).
67. See, e.g., Jaurequi v. Carter Mfg. Co., Inc., 173 F.3d 1076, 1084 (8th Cir.
1999); Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 293, 300 (8th Cir. 1996); Ram-
stad v. Lear Siegler Div. Holdings Corp., 836 F. Supp. 1511, 1516 (D. Minn. 1993);
DeLoach v. Rovema Corp., 527 S.E.2d 882, 883 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Liriano v.
Hobart Corp., 700 N.E.2d 303, 308 (N.Y. 1998).
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post-sale warning. 8 To determine if a "reasonable" seller would
provide a warning, the court must balance several factors, including
the ability to identify and communicate with product owners and
users.69  Third, mere technological advances or safety improve-
ments do not establish a continuing duty to warn.70
As discussed with respect to generic warning claims, post-sale
duty to warn claims are and should only be considered under a
negligence standard.7 ' In addition to the prevalent legal authority,
this position is supported by the "reasonable" seller standard
adopted by sections ten and eleven of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability.
VII. MYTH NO. 6: OTHER ACCIDENTS, CLAIMS OR LAWSUITS ARE
ADMISSIBLE IN A PRODUCT LIABILITY CASE
Evidence of other accidents, claims or lawsuits is frequently in-
jected into product liability cases through the wholesale admission
of irrelevant innuendo, hearsay testimony or documentary evi-
dence of questionable validity. In most jurisdictions, evidence of
other claims or incidents is only admissible if the circumstances of
the other accidents are "substantially similar" to the subject acci-
dent.72 Emphasis should rightly be placed on the term substantially.
The intent of this term is to insure that, while other proffered inci-
dents need not be identical in each and every respect, they must be
intrinsically similar in the critical particulars or the evidence is notS 73
relevant and, therefore, not admissible in evidence. Perhaps
more to the point, if evidence is provided of accidents that did not
occur under "substantially similar" circumstances, the proof is un-
fairly prejudicial and invites the jury to make its determination
based on an improper ground.4  With the possible exception of
68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 10.
69. See, e.g., Lovick, 588 N.W.2d at 694; Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg.
Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 1314-15 (Kan. 1993); Crowston v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 521 N.W.2d 401, 409 (N.D. 1994).
70. See, e.g., Williams v. Monarch Mach. Tool Co., 26 F.3d 228, 232 (1st Cir.
1994); Estate of Kimmel, 773 F. Supp. at 831; Kolesar v. Navistar Corp., 815 F. Supp.
818, 821 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (holding 1967 tractor not to be defective based on tech-
nology available at time of manufacture); see also Patton, 861 P.2d at 1311 (finding
no duty to notify customers of changes in state of the art).
71. See, e.g., Lovick, 588 N.W.2d at 694-95.
72. See, e.g.,Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 551 (D.C. Cir.
1993); Drabik v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc., 997 F.2d 496, 499-500 (8th Cir. 1993).
73. FED. R. EVID. 401, 402 & 403.
74. Drabik, 997 F.2d at 508-09 (8th Cir. 1993).
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subsequent remedial measures or a voluntary product recall, there
are few, if any, examples of more unduly prejudicial evidence. As a
result, defense counsel must ensure that plaintiffs are held strictly
accountable to the proper evidentiary standard. 5
"Substantial similarity" is a troublesome standard for most trial
judges who tend to err on the side of inclusion, as opposed to ex-
clusion of evidence. This, however, is the wrong approach. Evi-
dence of "other accidents" is peculiarly subject to misuse by the
jury.76 Accordingly, in addition to the substantial similarity re-
quirement, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is a second means to ex-
clude marginally relevant evidence of "other accidents." Error
caused by the admission of such evidence cannot be eradicated by
the use of limiting instructions.7
"Other accident" evidence may also be limited by critically ex-
amining the legal grounds for which the evidence is offered. For
example, plaintiffs frequently argue that proof of other accidents is
relevant to the issue of "notice." If a manufacturing defendant
concedes that it had notice, however, proof of the other accidents
is no longer necessary because the issue of "notice" is not in con-
troversy. Consequently, when it is questionable that the circum-
stances surrounding another accident satisfy the substantial similar-
ity requirement, a manufacturer may be able to preclude admission
of the evidence by stipulating to notice. Plaintiffs also proffer evi-
dence of other accidents on the issue of "feasibility." If a manufac-
turer can, under the facts and circumstances, admit the feasibility
of alternatives advocated by plaintiff, the evidence may not be ad-
missible on this basis. 8
When confronted with a plaintiffs attempt to present evidence
of other accidents, claims or lawsuits, defense counsel must first at-
75. See, e.g., Robert Sachs, Other Accident Evidence in Product Liability Actions:
Highly Probative or an Accident Waiting to Happen?, 49 OKA. L. REv. 257 (1996).
76. Drabik, 997 F.2d at 508-09.
77. Fish v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 779 F.2d 836, 840 (2nd Cir. 1985); Sheehy v.
Southern P. Transp. Co., 631 F.2d 649, 652 (9th Cir. 1980); Werner v. Upjohn Co.,
628 F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); United States
v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2nd Cir. 1980).
78. See generally Ross v. Black & Decker, Inc., 977 F.2d 1178, 1185 (7th Cir.
1992) (noting that evidence is not admissible on feasibility issue when feasibility is
conceded by the manufacturer); Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 886 F.2d 758, 764
(5th Cir. 1989) (stating that feasibility exception does not apply when manufac-
turer does not contest feasibility); Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d 1404, 1411
(10th Cir. 1988) (noting that when a manufacturer earlier stipulated to feasibility
of design change, the evidence was inadmissible); FED. R. EVID. 401, 402 & 403.
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tempt to exclude this evidence through the substantial similarity
standard. If this proves unsuccessful, it may be possible to wholly
eliminate or, at a minimum, limit the evidence by thoroughly ex-
amining the alleged justification for offering the proposed evi-
dence.
VIII. MYrH NO. 7: SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES ARE
ADMISSIBLE IN A PRODUCT LIABILITY CASE
Subsequent design changes or warnings added by a manufac-
turer can be troublesome, since there is "no clearer crystal ball"
than one that looks to the past. Several arguments, however, may
minimize or eliminate the potentially harmful effect of this evi-
dence.
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 governs the admissibility of sub-
sequent remedial measures. Prior to a 1997 amendment, Rule 407
was generally construed to exclude evidence of remedial measures
which occurred subsequent to the design or manufacture of a
product.79 The 1997 amendment to Rule 407, however, established
that the relevant point in time to determine whether a change or
modification was a subsequent remedial measure was the date of
the accident at issue.
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event,
measures are taken that, if taken previously, would have
made the injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of
the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negli-
gence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product, a defect in
a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction.
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of
subsequent measures when offered for another purpose,
such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of pre-
cautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
Consequently, while prior to the amendment which defined
the term event, a defendant was generally able to exclude evidence
of changes or modifications that occurred subsequent to design or
manufacture. While this issue has been clarified in Federal Rule
407, this issue is still subject to debate in state courts.
While the majority of courts apply Rule 407 to exclude evi-
79. See, e.g., Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc., 831 F.2d 1191, 1198 (3rd Cir.
1987).
80. FED. R. EVID. 407 (emphasis added).
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dence of subsequent remedial measures in product liability cases,8'
it is important to determine how the particular jurisdiction applies
the term "event." In some jurisdictions, a design change is not a
"subsequent remedial measure" unless it occurred subsequent to
the accident at issue. Alternatively, other jurisdictions have found
that subsequent remedial measures encompass any change subse-
quent to product manufacture or design. s
Obviously, evidence of subsequent design changes is not ex-
cluded if there are other recognized grounds for its admission. Po-
tential grounds for admissibility are set forth in the second sen-
tence of Rule 407 and include ownership, control, feasibility of
precautionary measures or impeachment. For example, if feasibil-
ity is a contested issue, a subsequent design modification may be
admissible solely on the issue of feasibility, but inadmissible on the
issue of fault or negligence.
Two recent Iowa cases illustrate the dangers of misapplying
Rule 407, even in the non-product liability setting. In Tucker v. Cat-
814erpillar, Inc., the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that Rule 407 did not
preclude evidence of post-sale design modifications and changes to
warnings that occurred before the accident at issue. The Tucker
court interpreted the term "event" in Iowa Rule of Evidence 407 to
mean the date of the accident at issue. Under this interpretation,
design changes that occurred subsequent to sale of a product, yet
before an accident, are admissible.
In MclIntosh v. Best Western Steeplegate Inn,85 the Iowa Supreme
Court eviscerated the protection afforded civil defendants, regard-
ing the admissibility of subsequent remedial measures, by Rule 407.
The facts of McIntosh were simple. Paul McIntosh, a motel
guest, slipped and fell in an icy parking lot.86 McIntosh filed an ac-
tion alleging that the motel was negligent, seeking recovery on a
premises liability theory.87 At trial, Plaintiff produced a photo-
81. In rejoint E. Dist. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 995 F.2d 343, 345-46 (2nd Cir.
1993); Raymond v. The Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1522-25 (1st Cir. 1991);
Hyjek v. Anthony Indus., 944 P.2d 1036, 1037-43 (Wash. 1997).
82. Tucker v. Caterpillar, Inc., 564 N.W.2d 410, 413-14 (Iowa 1997); Dixon v.
Jacobsen Mfg. Co., 637 A.2d 915, 924-25 (NJ. Super. Ct.), cert. denied, 642 A.2d
1004 (N.J. 1994).
83. See, e.g., Cover v. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864, 870-71 (N.Y. 1984); D.L. by Frie-
drichs v. Huebner, 329 N.W.2d 890, 909 (Wis. 1983).
84. 564 N.W.2d 410 (Iowa 1997).
85. 546 N.W.2d 595 (Iowa 1996).
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graph, taken by a motel employee one day after the accident, of the
parking lot where McIntosh allegedly fell.88 Although the photo-
graph did not reveal any ice in the area where the fall occurred,
Plaintiffs witnesses testified regarding the icy condition of the park-
ing lot.8 9 A witness for the defendant testified that the photograph
accurately depicted the condition of the parking lot at the time
McIntosh allegedly fell. 90
To impeach testimony given on behalf of the motel, McIntosh
proffered evidence that the motel manager ordered the application
of a deicing agent subsequent to the accident. 9' The trial court ex-
cluded this testimony, finding that it constituted inadmissible evi-
dence of a subsequent remedial measure under Iowa Rule of Evi-
dence 407.9 On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed the trial
court, ruling that the evidence should have been admitted.13 Most
troubling, however, is the exceedingly broad language in the opin-
ion that, if literally applied, would emasculate Rule 407. Under the
new rule established by the court in McIntosh, evidence demonstrat-
ing that subsequent remedial measures have been performed is
admissible as "circumstantial evidence" of conditions existing at the
time of an accident. If this is, in fact, the applicable standard, the
first sentence of Rule 407, which clearly states that such evidence is
inadmissible as proof of negligence or culpable conduct, is ren-
dered a nullity.
The most disturbing aspect of the McIntosh decision is that the
supreme court's holding was unnecessary to decide the case. Ini-
tially, the court found that evidence regarding the application of a
deicing agent, after a slip-and-fall incident on an allegedly icy park-
ing lot, was impeachment evidence to counter testimony offered by the
Defendant that the photograph of a "clean" parking lot demon-
strated its condition at the time of the accident. This conclusion
cannot be reasonably disputed. Given the facts in McIntosh and de-
fendant's testimony, the "subsequent remedial measure" was admis-
sible under the "impeachment" language in the second sentence of
Rule 407. Indeed, the Court so found. Thus, it was unnecessary to






93 Id. at 598.
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quent remedial measures were undertaken is circumstantial evi-
dence of the condition which existed at the time those measures
were taken.
While McIntosh was a negligence case grounded on a premises
liability theory, its importance to the application of Rule 407
should not be underestimated. For example, in a product liability
case based on failure to warn, subsequent changes to the product's
warnings are not ordinarily admissible because they may be consid-
ered as proof of "negligence or culpable conduct." In most juris-
dictions and under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability,
however, product cases alleging failure to warn are grounded in
negligence only. As a result, based on the unnecessary dicta and
confusing language in McIntosh, any changes may be admissible as
"circumstantial proof' that the warning, in its condition at the time
of the accident, was the byproduct of a negligent act. This result
abolishes the protection afforded by Rule 407.
IX. MYTH NO. 8: THERE IsA DUTYTO "REMIND" USERS OR
CONSUMERS OF KNOWN, UNDERSTOOD OR OBVIOUS PRODUCT
DANGERS
In many cases, although a particular plaintiff was aware of the
hazard presented or the danger was open and obvious, expert wit-
nesses will often "volunteer" testimony that the defendant should
have given a warning to "remind" the plaintiff of the danger. As a
closely-related corollary to this argument, the expert will explain
that one legitimate purpose for on-product warnings is to "remind"
users of any dangers presented. Obviously, experts and consultants
must not be permitted to opine regarding a manufacturer's "duty."
This is a legal question for the court.
Further, there is no legal duty to remind a plaintiff of that
which is already known or of dangers that are open and obvious.
94
A manufacturer's obligation to provide warnings and instructions is
governed by a negligence standard. The applicable standard is
94. Billiar v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 623 F.2d 240, 243 (2nd Cir. 1980)
(stating that "no one needs notice of that which he already knows"); Sowles v. Ur-
schel Lab., Inc., 595 F.2d 1361, 1365 (8th Cir. 1979) (quoting McIntyre v. Everest
& Jennings, Inc., 575 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1978) ("no one needs notice of what
he knows or reasonably may be expected to know")); Eimers v. Honda Motor Co.,
785 F. Supp. 1204, 1213 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (concluding that "[k]nowledge is equiva-
lent to prior notice"); Arnold v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 834 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Mo.
1992) (finding that there is no breach of the duty to warn if a warning would not
have provided additional information).
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provided by section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts9 5 There
is no duty, under that standard, to provide warnings respecting
conditions or dangers that were known by and obvious to a claim-
ant. "Where risks are known and obvious, there is no need for a
warning under the standards provided in Section 388.
96
The purpose of a warning or instruction is to impart additional
knowledge or information to a product user.97
Requiring a warning as a reminder is also contrary to the
prima facie elements of a warning claim. As an element of a failure
to warn claim, Plaintiffs must establish that a warning, if provided,
98would have prevented the accident. There is no duty to provide a
warning for a danger that is known to a particular product user.99
If a plaintiff subjectively knows of the danger involved, any failure
to warn will not be a proximate cause of the injury. 10 "Where the
plaintiff knows of a danger, a warning cannot increase his aware-
ness of its presence, and where a warning would not have pre-
vented the harm, a failure to warn cannot be the proximate cause
of the injury."'0 '
While it may be difficult to prevent plaintiff s expert from
opining that one purpose of a warning is to serve as a reminder, the
trial court should not instruct the jury that the manufacturer has a
legal duty to remind a product user of known dangers. Further,
when such evidence or testimony has been presented, defense
counsel should seek a limiting instruction advising the jury that
there is no obligation to provide warnings or reminders against
known or obvious dangers.
95. Rowson v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 866 F. Supp. 1221, 1232 (N.D. Iowa
1994); Nichols v. Westfield Indus., Ltd., 380 N.W.2d 392, 401 (Iowa 1985).
96. Id. at 401 (citing additional authority); see also Games v. Gulf & W. Mfg.
Co., 789 F.2d 637, 640 (8th Cir. 1986).
97. Billiar, 623 F.2d at 243; Sowles, 595 F.2d at 1365; Eimers, 785 F. Supp. at
1213; Arnold, 834 S.W.2d at 194.
98. Eimers, 785 F. Supp. at 1213; Arnold, 834 S.W.2d at 194 (noting that a
plaintiff must demonstrate "that a warning would have altered the behavior of the
individuals involved in the accident").
99. See, e.g., Billiar, 623 F.2d at 243 (ruling that a defendant cannot be held
liable for a failure to warn when product user is aware of the danger upon which
the claim is premised); Sowles, 595 F.2d at 1366 (finding that there is no breach of
duty to provide a warning when plaintiff has knowledge of the alleged danger);
Neri v. John Deere Co., 621 N.Y.S.2d 227, 229 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (holding that
there is no duty to warn when a warning would not impart greater knowledge than
that already possessed from the plaintiffs observations and experience).
100. Arnold v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 834 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Mo. 1992).
101. Eimers v. Honda Motor Co., 785 F. Supp. 1204, 1213 (W.D. Pa. 1992).
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X. MYrH No. 9: IN A FAILURE To WARN CASE, THERE ISA
PLAINTIFF'S HEEDING PRESUMPTION AND CAUSATION DOES NOT
HAVE TO BE PROVEN
The heeding presumption originated in comment (j) to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402A and was intended to re-
lieve manufacturers from liability for any perceived dangers or de-
fects that were the subject of warnings. "Where warning is given,
the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a
product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is fol-
lowed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably danger-
ous." 10 2 Many courts, however, have mistakenly applied the heeding
presumption to eliminate the requirement that a plaintiff prove
causation in a failure to warn case. This argument is contrary to
the original intent and purpose of the heeding presumption."'
Applying the language from comment (j), which was clearly in-
tended to shield manufacturers who provide adequate warnings
with their products, in this manner permits Plaintiffs to omit a cru-
cial element in a failure to warn claim, causation. The drafters of
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability have nullified this
inequity by eliminating the heeding presumption altogether.1
5
When confronted with the argument that it is presumed the
plaintiff would have read and followed a proposed product warn-
ing, the following steps are recommended. First, the language of
comment (j), the source of this presumption, should be addressed.
Comment (j) neither mentions nor creates a presumption that a
warning would have been followed.'0 6 In fact, the language in
comment (j) is wholly devoid of any causation analysis, but instead
only provides a basis for concluding that a manufacturer who has
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt.j (1977) (emphasis added).
103. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1272 (5th Cir.1974), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974) (heeding presumption favors manufacturer when warn-
ing is present and user when no warning is present); Rowson v. Kawasaki Heavy
Indus., Ltd., 866 F. Supp. 1221, 1231 (N.D. Iowa 1994) (proving that a warning was
absent or inadequate permits presumption that plaintiff would have heeded an
adequate warning).
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j; Henderson & Twerski,
supra note 50, at 279 (noting that the "heeding presumption" was intended to es-
tablish that a manufacturer which provided an adequate warning had discharged
its duty and could not be held responsible on a failure to warn claim).
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, cmt. 1 (1998);
Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 937-38 (Kan. 2000) (no heeding presump-
tion adopted by the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY).
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt.j.
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provided an adequate warning has discharged its duty to warn.10'
Further, the language contained in comment (j) has be purpose-
fully eliminated from the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liabil-
ity. Second, the presumption may be defeated with case specific
evidence that the proposed warning was not feasible or that the
plaintiff, because of his or her own behavior patterns, would not
have followed the warning. °8 Finally, several recent cases have re-
fused to recognize a presumption favoring the plaintiff based upon
the logical fallacy of relying upon the language of comment (j).'09
XI. MYTH No. 10: THE FAILURE To USE A SEAT BELT IS
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE, EVEN IN A CRASHWORTHINESS CASE
Many jurisdictions have adopted legislation that precludes or
strictly limits evidence of a plaintiffs failure to wear an available
seat belt (the seat belt defense) as a basis for comparative fault."' It
is often argued that this prohibition, which is usually contained
within mandatory seat belt use legislation, precludes defendants
from reducing their responsibility for accidents because of an in-
jured party's failure to engage in conduct (i.e., wear a seat belt)
that is not recognized as a legal duty. 1' These evidentiary restric-
tions, however, are subject to attack on several grounds.
First, the dual evidentiary and damage limitations are contrary
to established law. Mandatory seat belt legislation was adopted,
pursuant to federal edict, in an effort to save lives and reduce acci-
dent related injuries and transactional costs. 2 The federal legisla-
107. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 50, at 279.
108. See, e.g., Meyerhoffv. Michelin Tire Corp., 852 F. Supp. 933, 944 (D. Kan.
1994), affd, 70 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 1995); Graves v. Church & Dwight Co., 631
A.2d 1248, 1256 (N.J. Super. Ct.), cert. denied, 636 A.2d 523 (N.J. 1993); Reynolds &
Casini, Confronting the Heeding Presumption in Failure to Warn Cases, 37(10) FOR THE
DEFENSE 6 (1995).
109. Odom v. G.D. Searle & Co., 979 F.2d 1001, 1003 (4th Cir. 1992); Thomas
v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806, 813 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 504 U.S.
956 (1992); Meyerhoff, 852 F. Supp. 933, 947; Ramstad v. Lear Siegler Diversified
Holdings Corp., 836 F. Supp. 1511, 1520 (D. Minn. 1993); Riley v. American
Honda Motor Co., 856 P.2d 196, 200 (Mont. 1993); Graves, 631 A.2d at 1257;
Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Lee, 880 S.W.2d 750, 755 (Tex. 1993); Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 359 (Tex. 1993).
110. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 321.445, subd. 4(b) (1999).
111. See, e.g., Hutchins v. Schwartz, 724 P.2d 1194, 1197 (Alaska 1986); Law v.
Superior Court, 755 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Ariz. 1988); Waterson v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
544 A.2d 357, 367-68 (N.J. 1988); Amend v. Bell, 570 P.2d 138, 143 (Wash. 1977).
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tion which encouraged the adoption of mandatory use laws en-
dorsed state legislation with the following features: 1) imposition of
a penalty for violating mandatory use laws; 2) mitigation of per-
sonal injury damages in civil actions; and 3) implementation of a
program encouraging seat belt usage." Further, the limitations
undermine the purpose and intent of comparative fault.'14 More-
over, mandator use legislation is generally applicable only to front115
seat occupants. As a result, based solely on an occupant's loca-
tion in an automobile, a rear seat occupant may receive disparate
treatment.
Second, it may be possible to challenge the limitations based
on constitutional due process and equal protection grounds. While
some attempts have been, to date, unsuccessul, 16 few (if any) cases
have explored the constitutionality of the limitations as applied to a
manufacturer in the crashworthiness context.
Finally, it may be argued that the limitations are not applicable
to crashworthiness or enhanced injury claims. This may be accom-
plished in two ways. First, even in jurisdictions that do not permit
evidence of seat belt non-use for comparative fault purposes, seat
belt evidence may be admissible on the issue of causatn." Causa-
tion is a key issue in any product liability case and a primafacie ele-
ment of plaintiffs case, whether based on strict liability, negligence
or warranty. While not expressly recognized by the statute, evi-
dence regarding a plaintiffs failure to wear a seat belt, to demon-
strate sole proximate cause, has been admitted in jurisdictions that
113. MacDonald v. Gen. Motors Corp., 784 F. Supp. 486, 494 (M.D. Tenn.
1992) (citing pertinent C.F.R. provisions).
114. Prior v. United States Postal Serv., 985 F.2d 440, 442-43 (8th Cir. 1993)
(comparative fault is designed to equitably distribute financial responsibility for
damages amongst negligent parties in proportion to their causal fault); see also
LaHue v. Gen. Motors Corp., 716 F. Supp. 407, 415-16 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (noting
that it is contrary to the premise of comparative fault to hold automobile manufac-
turers responsible for injuries directly attributable to a plaintiffs failure to use an
available seat belt); Hutchins, 724 P.2d at 1198 (admitting evidence regarding
claimant's failure to wear a seat belt comports with purpose of comparative fault;
defendants should only be responsible for damages resulting directly from their
negligence); Law, 755 P.2d at 1139 (admitting seat belt evidence promotes the
goals of comparative fault, apportionment of damages in proportion to culpabil-
ity).
115. IowA CODE, § 321.445(2) (1999).
116. See, e.g., Duntz v. Zeimet, 478 N.W.2d 635 (Iowa 1991); Ullery v. Sobie,
492 N.W.2d 739 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Bendner v. Carr, 532 N.E.2d 178 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1987).
117. MacDonald, 784 F. Supp. at 499-500; LaHue, 716 F. Supp. at 416; Gen. Mo-
tors Corp. v. Wolhar, 686 A.2d 170, 175 (Del. 1996).
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limit or restrict the use of seat belt evidence.' A manufacturer
should not be held responsible for injuries that result from the
plaintiffs, as opposed to the manufacturer's, negligent acts. "9
Under the permitted theory of alternate cause, i.e., plain-
tiffs carelessness, evidence of such actions may be admit-
ted. Even though plaintiff may not have had a duty to
wear a seat belt.., a defendant may attempt to prove that
the injuries were caused by something other than an al-
leged design defect. If evidence shows that all or part of
the injury is attributable to something other than a design
defect, the critical element of causation is missing. In that
instance, the defendant is not, and should not be, liable
for harm which that defendant did not cause by way of a
design defect.2
Excluding evidence demonstrating that the claimant's injuries
resulted from the failure to wear a seat belt is akin to the imposing
absolute liability, rendering the manufacturer an insurer of its-- 121
product. Accordingly, seat belt evidence should be admissible to
demonstrate that the claimant's nonuse of a seat belt was the sole
proximate cause of his or her injuries. When this occurs, however,
the court may require a limiting instruction advising the jury that
the evidence should be considered solely for the purpose of deter-
mining proximate causation.1
2
Alternatively, the failure to use an available seat belt may be
admissible on the issue of fault in a crashworthiness case because
most mandatory use legislation limits the evidence in the context of
claims related to the use or operation of an automobile.
In any action to recover damages arising out of the owner-
ship, common maintenance or operation of a motor vehicle, fail-
ure to wear a safety belt in violation of this section shall
not be considered evidence of comparative negligence.
Failure to wear a safety belt in violation of this section may
be admitted to mitiate damages, but only under [lim-
ited] circumstances.
An enhanced injury claim against a motor vehicle manufac-
118. See, e.g., MacDonald, 784 F. Supp. at 499-500 (construing Tennessee stat-
ute); LaHue, 716 F. Supp. at 416 (reviewing Missouri statute).
119. MacDonald v. Gen. Motors Corp., 784 F. Supp. 486, 499-500 (M.D. Tenn.
1992); LaHue, 716 F. Supp. at 416.
120. LaHue v. Gen. Motors Corp., 716 F. Supp. 407, 416 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
121. MacDonald, 784 F. Supp. at 499-500 (citing LaHue, 716 F. Supp. at 416).
122. Id. at 500.
123. Mo. REv. STAT., § 307.178.3 (1994) (emphasis added).
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turer, however, does not arise out of the use or operation of the
vehicle, but instead, out of the design of the automobile and its
safety features. 24 Evidentiary and damage limitations, similar to
those adopted by both Iowa and Missouri, limit the amount that a
plaintiffs damages may be reduced in actions arising from the
ownership or operation of a motor vehicle, but do not apply, by
their specific terms, to product liability actions.
The legislature clearly specified the sorts of cases in which
evidence of failure to use seat belts was inadmissible.
Conspicuously absent is any reference to the design or con-
struction of a motor vehicle. Even the most liberal inter-
pretation of the words ownership, common maintenance
and operation cannot stretch far enough to include de-
sign and construction. The plain meaning of the statute
compels a conclusion that it was not intended to prevent
evidence of failure to use seat belts in a products liability
case.
Acting within this context [with knowledge of the exis-
tence of products liability and crashworthiness claims],
the legislature must be presumed to know it could have
included products liability cases in the statute if it in-
tended to restrict evidence in those cases. Inasmuch as
the statute does not apply to the case at hand, the one-
percent limit on reduction of damages also does not ap-
ply.
This finding is in accord with other courts which have deter-
mined that a plaintiffs failure to utilize an existing seat belt is in-
herently relevant when damages are sought pursuant to a crashwor-
thiness claim.
126
Consequendy, when defending a crashworthiness or enhanced
injury claim, where the claimant was not wearing a seat belt and the
use of a passenger restraint may have reduced or entirely elimi-
nated the injuries sustained, a manufacturing defendant should
raise this issue as a defense, regardless of any existing statutory
damage limitations.
124. See, e.g., LaHue, 716 F. Supp. at 412.
125. Id. (emphasis in original).
126. Dahl v. Bayerische Motoren Werke, 748 P.2d 77, 79 (Or. 1987); Maskrey v.
Volkswagen Werke Aktiengesellschaft, 370 N.W.2d 815, 820 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODucTs LIABILITY § 16 cmt. f (1998).
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XII. CONCLUSION
Frequently, and most likely because of their novel nature,
product liability claims and the requirements for recovery are mis-
understood. Depending upon the degree and nature of this mis-
understanding, product liability law may be improperly applied.
When this occurs, responsible product sellers are unjustifiedly held
responsible for injuries and damages which were not the result of
negligent or improper conduct. This exacts a toll on society as a
whole through, among other things, price increases and the un-
availability of beneficial and useful products. The first step toward
proper application of and responsibility under product liability law
is a thorough understanding of general principles and the elimina-
tion of prevalent misconceptions. While this responsibility extends
to both the judiciary and legal practitioners, trial counsel is the first
line of defense for a product manufacturer and must be knowl-
edgeable to protect the manufacturer's interests. This knowledge
must include a general understanding of product liability concepts,
the law in a particular jurisdiction and an appreciation of common
misconceptions. Consequently, it is important that defense counsel
be prepared to assist the court in properly eliminating redundant
or inappropriate claims, instructing the jury on the applicable law
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